

## Message Text

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46

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W  
----- 060361

R 201345Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4195

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 REYKJAVIK 1539

EXDIS - SPECAT

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR IC NATO  
SUBJECT: IDF NEGOTIATIONS

FOLLOWING MSG FROM COMICEDFOR DTG 181935Z SENT ACTION CINCLANT  
INFO REYKJAVIK DEC 18 REPEATED TO YOU.  
QUOTE

S E C R E T SPECAT  
SECTION ONE OF THREE  
IDF NEGOTIATIONS  
A. SECSTATE 011825Z DEC 73  
1. DURING THE LAST SESSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT  
THERE IS INCREASING PRESSURE FOR A MORE DETAILED LOOK AT THE STRUCTUR  
E  
AND COMPOSITION OF THE DEFENSE FORCE. THE BREAKDOWN THAT FOLLOWS IS  
BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ICELAND WANTS TO MAINTAIN A FORCE CAPABL  
E  
OF DIRECT DEFENSE OF ICELAND AND THEREFORE IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO  
MAXIMIZE THE NUMBERS INVOLVED IN DIRECT DEFENSE. THERE ARE THREE BASI  
C  
QUESTIONS THAT KEEP RECURRING AS ICELANDIC OFFICIALS PROBE THE DETAIL  
S  
OF OUR OPERATIONS. THESE QUESTIONS ARE:  
A. WHY CAN'T UNITS BE BASED AT OTHER LOCATIONS AND DO THEIR TASKS ON  
A  
ROTATIONAL BASIS FROM ICELAND?  
B. WHY CAN'T SPECIFIC JOBS OR TASKS BE PERFORMED BY CIVILIANS?

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C. WHY CAN'T A CIVILIAN-MANNED SURVEILLANCE BASE, WITH A NATO COMMITM  
ENT

PAGE TWO RUDISDD0001 S E C R E T SPECAT

FOR DEFENSE IN WAR TIME, SERVE AS SUFFICIENT DEFENSE FOR ICELAND?

2. REF A PRESENTED A NEW TABLE THREE FOR SUBMISSION TO THE GOI. AL-  
THOUGH

CORRECT IN MILITARY STRENGTH ASSIGNED AND REDUCTIONS PROPOSED, IT IS  
POSSIBLE THAT THE TABLE RAISES ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND TENDS TO OPEN

THE DOOR FOR A MORE DETAILED LOOK WITHOUT PROVIDING SUFFICIENT GUIDAN  
CE

FOR ANSWERS TO THE BASIC QUESTIONS DISCUSSED IN PARA 1 ABOVE. RECOGNI  
Z-

ING THAT THERE IS A UNANIMOUS PUSH BY GOI OFFICIALS FOR A CLOSER  
EXAMINATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE FORCE, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MORE  
COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. NEGOTIATING

TEAM FOR USE AT THEIR DISCRETION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE ESTABLISH  
AGREEMENT ON THE BREAKDOWN OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE, TOGETHER  
WITH EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS, IN LANGUAGE THAT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD BY IC  
E-

LANDERS, AND WHICH PROVIDES ANSWERS TO THE THREE BASIC QUESTIONS IN  
PARA

1 ABOVE. AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IS REQUIRED TO AVOID EXTEMPOR-  
ANEUS OR AD HOC DECISIONS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE NEGOTIATING  
SESSIONS.

3. IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT DOCUMENTS THAT ARE FORMALLY PRESENTED TO  
THE  
GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND NEGOTIATING TEAM WILL MOST ASSUREDLY BE PRESENT  
ED  
TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PROBABLY TO THE ALTHING, AND  
POSSIBLY  
FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE PUBLIC MEDIA. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MORE  
DETAILED

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INFORMATION DISCUSSED OVER THE NEGOTIATING TABLE OR DISCUSSED INFORMA  
LLY

BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATORS CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE RETAINED WITHIN THE MFA  
AND NOT SUBJECTED TO THE SAME DEGREE OF INTENSE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC  
SCRUTINY.

4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT WE HAV  
E

TWO VERSIONS OF TABLE THREE. THE FIRST VERSION TO INCLUDE GENERAL FUN  
CT-

IONAL STATEMENTS AND AGGREGATE PERSONNEL TABULATIONS, REALIZING THAT  
THIS TABLE WILL BE FORMALLY PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND AN  
D

MAY APPEAR IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. A SECOND VERSION OF THE TABLE WOULD  
CONTAIN MORE DETAILED INFORMATION AND WOULD BE PROVIDED INFORMALLY BY  
U.S. NEGOTIATORS AT THEIR DISCRETION TO THE GOI NEGOTIATORS.

5. TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS OF PARA 1 IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNIT  
ED

STATES, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE INFORMATION WE PROVIDE SUPPORT THE N  
EC-  
ESSITY FOR THE MILITARY NATURE OF KEY OPERATIONS AND THAT THERE BE A  
LOGICAL PROGRESSION TOWARD MORE CIVILIZATION OF THE LESS SENSITIVE  
FUNCTIONS AND LESS COMBAT-ORIENTED TASKS. THE GENERAL THRUST OF THE U  
.S.

POSITION SHOULD BE THAT NEITHER ICELANDIC NOR U. S. CIVILIANS CAN BE  
TASKED WITH RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVING COMBAT DUTIES. TO ACCOMPLISH T  
HE

ABOVE, THE TABLE IS RESTRUCTURED IN DESCENDING ORDER ACCORDING TO THE

NECESSITY FOR PREDOMINANT MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF THE FUNCTIONS. TO

PAGE FOUR RUDISDD0001 S E C R E T SPECAT

EMPHASIZE THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS,

AIR

FORCES ICELAND IS SPLIT INTO TWO CATEGORIES--SUPPORT AND COMMAND AND  
CONTROL; AIR DEFENSE RADARS ARE SPLIT INTO THE FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES  
OF

COMMUNICATION AND SURVEILLANCE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SOME OF TH  
E

SUPPORT TASKS WITHIN THE FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON ARE SHOWN UNDER

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DEFENSE SUPPORT.

TABLE III

FOR PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND

ARTICLE V OF THE NATO TREATY STATES THAT "THE PARTIES AGREE THAT ARME  
D

ATTACK AGAINST ONE... SHALL BE CONSIDERED AN ATTACK AGAINST THEM ALL

...

AND THAT EACH OF THEM ... WILL ASSIST THE PARTIES SO ATTACKED BY TAKI  
NG

FORTHWITH INDIVIDUALLY AND IN CONCERT ... SUCH ACTION AS IS DEEMED NE  
CE-

SSARY ... TO RESTORE AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ALANTIC  
AREA." FURTHER, ARTICLE XI OF THIS TREATY PROVIDES THAT "... ITS  
PROVISIONS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT BY THE PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
IR

RESPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES." ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE ARTICLES  
REVEALS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY WILL REQUIRE TIME ON THE PA  
RT

OF THE NATO ALLIES: HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN ICELAND  
WILL ASSURE EXPEDITIOUS REACTION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES. TH

E

KEY THEREFORE, TO THE SECURITY OF ICELAND, IS TO PROVIDE THE BASIC

PAGE FIVE RUDISDD0001 S E C R E T SPECAT

ORGANIZATION FOR INITIAL PROTECTION AND EXPEDITIOUS REINFORCEMENT TO  
ALLOW NATO MEMBERS DUE PROCESS IN IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS OF THE TREA  
TY.

THE CONCEPT OF THE DEFENSE FORCE ORGANIZATION IS TO PROVIDE A CREDIBL

E  
AND REAL DEFENSE SO THAT, IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK, REINFORCEMENT CAN BE  
E  
RAPIDLY INTRODUCED TO BUILD AN EXPANDED FORCE ADEQUATE FOR THE OVERAL  
L  
DEFENSE OF ICELAND. SO LONG AS THESE DEFENSES REMAIN CREDIBLE, THEY  
WILL DETER ATTACK. WITH DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE ESTABLISHED, WE CAN LOOK  
OK  
TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GENUINE DETENTE, AS OPPOSED TO THE ILLUSION OF  
F  
DETENTE, ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OF NATO. ONLY THROUGH ENSURING THE  
SECRET

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APPROPRIATE BALANCE OF DEFENSE, DETERRENCE AND DETENTE CAN THE SECURITY  
TY  
AND INDEPENDENCE OF ICELAND BE ASSURED. A CREDIBLE DEFENSE MUST NOT  
ONLY SATISFY OUR OWN JUDGMENT, BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, IT MUST BE  
BELIEVABLE TO A POTENTIAL ENEMY. WITHOUT A VIABLE AND CREDIBLE  
DEFENSE, DETERRENCE FAILS AND, WITH THE SPEED OF MODERN WARFARE, AN  
ATTACKING FORCE COULD SEIZE KEY INSTALLATIONS IN ICELAND BEFORE  
REINFORCEMENT ACTION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. IF AN UNDEFENDED  
SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY WERE MAINTAINED, AND EVEN IF THE SURVEIL-  
LANCE CAPABILITY WAS ABLE TO PREDICT THE PROBABILITY OF IMPENDING  
ATTACK, INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT FORCES IN A CRISIS SITUATION MIGHT  
BE CONSIDERED DESTABILIZING, WITH THE RESULT THAT POLITICAL CONSIDER-

PAGE SIX RUDISDD0001 SECRET SPECAT  
ATIONS COULD PRECLUDE DEPLOYMENT PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ONSET OF ATTACK.  
WITHOUT DEFENSES, DETERRENCE FAILS AND EVEN A MODEST ATTACK IS ASSURE  
D  
OF SUCCESS. WITH THE ENEMY IN CONTROL OF KEY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILI

-  
TIES IN ICELAND, NATO WOULD BE FACED WITH TWO VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES.  
NA-  
THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO COUNTERATTACK AND DRIVE THE ENEMY FROM THE POSITIONS THEY HOLD. SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD BE A MAJOR OPERATION AND COULD HAVE A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON ICELAND. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD REQUIRE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ENEMY FACILITIES IN ICELAND AND, AT LEAST DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF WAR, THE ISOLATION

N  
OF ICELAND SO THAT IT COULD NOT BE USED AS A BASE BY THE ENEMY. THIS LATTER ALTERNATIVE WOULD RESULT IN COMPLETE CUTOFF FROM NATO ALLIES AND

ND  
WOULD BE Equally DEVASTATING TO THE PEOPLE OF ICELAND. IT IS THEREFORE VITAL TO MAINTAIN CREDIBLE DEFENSES SO THAT DETERRENCE IS ASSURED. TO ACCOMPLISH THE ABOVE, THE FORCE IS FUNCTIONALLY ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS:  
294 MILITARY PERSONNEL, LESS THAN 10 PER CENT OF THE FORCE, ARE DEDICATED TO COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR THE MILITARY SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF THE DEFENSE EFFORT. ALMOST 1/3 OF THE FORCE

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W  
----- 060151

R 201345Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4196

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 REYKJAVIK 1539

EXDIS - SPECAT

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR IC NATO  
SUBJECT: IDF NEGOTIATIONS

FOLLOWING MSG FROM COMICEDFOR DTG 181935Z SENT ACTION CINCLANT  
INFO REYKJAVIK DEC 18 REPEATED TO YOU.

QUOTE

S E C R E T SPECAT  
SECTION TWO OF THREE  
FORCE.  
A BASIC CONCEPT OF THE TABLE BELOW IS THAT CIVILIANS, U.S. OR ICELANDIC,

CANNOT BE ASSIGNED DUTIES WHICH WOULD REQUIRE DIRECT ENCOUNTER WITH THE  
ENEMY. UTILIZING THE RATIONALE ABOVE, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT, ON A PER-  
CENTAGE BASIS, CIVILIANIZATION IS SMALLEST IN THE COMBAT-RELATED  
FUNCTIONS PROGRESSING TOWARD GREATER CIVILIANIZATION IN THE SUPPORT AND

SUPPORT-RELATED AREAS.

ROTATIONAL REDUC REDUC W

/ EXPLANATION MILITARY UNIT W/O SCTY SCTY  
FUNCTION OF FUNCTION STRENGTH REDUCTIONS CLEARANCE CLEARANC  
E  
COMMAND & MILITARY SUPERVISION, 294 0 0 -12  
CONTROL DIRECTION & CONTROL  
OF AIR, SEA & LAND  
SECRET

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PAGE TWO RUDISDD0002 S E C R E T SPECAT

COMBAT SYSTEMS & UNITS  
AS WELL AS SUPPORT AND  
LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES.  
DEFENSE UNITS MOST DIRECTLY 969 -425 0 -18  
COMBAT CONCERNED WITH  
OPERATIONS EXECUTING THE DEFENSE

MISSION. IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK, THESE UNITS WOULD MAKE INITIAL COMBAT CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES. THEIR MISSIONS INCLUDE SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, TRACKING, AND, IF NECESSARY, DESTRUCTION OF HOSTILE SHIPS, SUBMARINES & AIRCRAFT. THEY ALSO ENTAIL NATO BASE SECURITY AND DIRECT ENGAGEMENT WITH HOSTILE GROUND FORCES. A COLLATERAL MISSION IS NEUTRALIZING

PAGE THREE RUDISDD0002 S E C R E T SPECAT

POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN A PEACETIME OR COMBAT ENVIRONMENT.

SURVEIL- UTILIZING CLASSIFIED 811 0 -115 -65

LANCE EQUIPMENT & HIGHLY COMMUN- SOPHISTICATED TECHNIQUES, ICATIONS CONDUCTS OCEAN & AIR

SURVEILLANCE FOR DETEC-  
TION & EARLY WARNING,  
AND PROVIDES COMMUNICATIONS  
FOR DISSEMINATION OF INFORMA-  
TION TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE READI-

SECRET

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NESS OF DEFENSE FORCE COMBAT RESOURCES.

DEFENSE PROVIDES SPECIALIZED 304 0 0 -49

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & PERSONNEL

EXPERTISE TO SUPPORT  
UNIT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE  
ACTIVITIES IN REPAIR &  
READINESS TESTING OF

PAGE FOUR RUDISDD0002 S E C R E T SPECAT

COMBAT SYSTEMS TO ASSURE  
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF OPERA-  
TIONAL AIRCRAFT.

OPERA- PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR 47 0 -11 -11

TIONS ACCURATE, PRECISE & SAFE

SUPPORT NAVIGATION. OBSERVES, COLLECTS,

ANALYZES & REPORTS WEATHER DATA  
AND CONDITIONS. PROVIDES FORE-  
CASTS OF WEATHER AFFECTING  
MILITARY OPERATIONS.  
IN THE EVENT OF  
DEFENSE OPERATIONS,

PROVIDES CLASSIFIED  
WEATHER BRIEFINGS FOR  
COMBAT OPERATIONS.

SEARCH & UTILIZING SOPHISTICATED 53 -20 0 -2

RESCUE EQUIPMENT & PERSONNEL

HIGHLY TRAINED IN  
SPECIALIZED TECHNIQUES,  
PROVIDES SEARCH FOR

PAGE FIVE RUDISDD0002 S E C R E T SPECAT

AND RESCUE OF PERSONNEL  
IN DISTRESS ON LAND OR  
AT SEA. CRUCIAL TO THIS  
MISSION ARE PERSONNEL  
SPECIALY TRAINED  
AS MEDICAL PARACHUTISTS.

SECRET

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IN THE EVENT OF DEFENSE  
OPERATIONS, EXECUTES  
SEARCH & RESCUE MISSIONS  
IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT.

GENERAL PROVIDES FOOD, CLOTHING, 839 0 -283 -43

SUPPORT SHELTER, EQUIPMENT AND

MOBILITY SUPPORT FOR ALL OF  
THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES. IN  
THE EVENT OF DEFENSE OPERA-  
TIONS, SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ARE  
DRAWN DOWN TO PROVIDE TRAINED  
PERSONNEL FOR ADDITIONAL INFANTRY  
COMPANIES TO SUPPLE-  
MENT THE GROUND

PAGE SIX RUDISDD0002 S E C R E T SPECAT

DEFENCE FORCE.

TOTAL 3317 -445 -409 -20

0

2872 2463 226

3

TABLE III  
FOR USE BY U.S. NEGOTIATING TEAM  
ROTATIONAL REDUC REDUC

W/

FUNCTION UNIT MISSION MILITARY UNIT W/O SCTY SCTY  
UNITS STATEMENT STRENGTH REDUCTIONS CLEARANCE CLEARA  
NCE

COMMAND & COMMANDS, COORDINATES 48 ---- ---- ----

CONTROL & CONTROLS JOINT DEFENSE

HQ ICELAND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

DEFENSE

FORCE

FLEET AIR DIRECTS & COORDINATES 111 ---- --- -12  
KEFLAVIK OCEAN SURVEILLANCE &  
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

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AIR DEFENSE DIRECTS, CONTROLS AND 117 ---- A ---- --  
--  
RADAR COM- COORDINATES AIR SUR-  
MAND AND VEILLANCE ACTIVITY

PAGE SEVEN RUDISDD0002 S E C R E T SPECAT  
CONTROL AND AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS.  
AIR FORCES DIRECTS EMPLOYMENT OF 18 ---- --- --

-  
ICELAND AIR DEFENSE RESOURCES.  
COMMAND  
SECRET

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46  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W  
----- 060185  
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FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4197

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 REYKJAVIK 1539

EXDIS - SPECAT

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR IC NATO  
SUBJECT: IDF NEGOTIATIONS

S E C R E T SPECAT  
SECTION THREE OF THREE  
TRACKING AND, IF NECESSARY,  
DESTRUCTION OF HOSTILE  
SHIPS & SUBMARINES.

AIRBORNE EXTENDS SURVEILLANCE, 42 -80 ---- ----  
EARLY DETECTION & CONTROL  
WARNING CAPABILITY OF ICELAND-  
DETACHMENT BASED AIR DEFENSES.

MARINE PROVIDES SECURITY FOR 129 ---- ---- -18  
BARRACKS THE NATO BASE AND

RESOURCES AND IS NUCLEUS  
OF GROUND DEFENSE FORCE

PAGE TWO RUDISDD0003 S E C R E T SPECAT  
WHICH IS SUPPLEMENTED BY  
OTHER UNITS.

EXPLOSIVE INVESTIGATES, IDENTIFIES, 3 ---- --- ---  
ORDNANCE DISARMS AND/OR DISPOSES OF  
SECRET

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DISPOSAL POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ORDNANCE.

969 -425 0 -18

SURVEILLANCE &  
COMMUNICATIONS

NAVAL RADIO DIRECTION 148 ---- --- -8  
SECURITY FINDING.  
GROUP  
ACTIVITY

NAVAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE 129 ---- --- -12  
FACILITY

AIR DEFENSE AIR SURVEILLANCE 172 ---- -59 -31

PAGE THREE RUDISDD0003 S E C R E T SPECAT  
RADARS PROVIDING RADAR

DETECTION OF AIR-  
CRAFT.

NAVAL PROVIDES COMMUNICA- 326 ---- -56 -1

4  
COMMUNICA- TIONS FOR ALL ELEMENTS  
TION STA- OF ICELAND DEFENSE  
TION FORCE. HANDLES  
ENCRYPTION & DECRYPTION  
UTILIZING CODES  
AND CIPHERS.

811 ---- -115 -6

5

DEFENSE  
SUPPORT

AIRCRAFT SUPPORT OR OPERA- 284 ---- --- -2

9  
INTERMEDIATE TIONAL PREPARATION,  
MAINTENANCE REPAIR, MAINTENANCE  
SECRET

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DEPARTMENT & READINESS TESTING

PAGE FOUR RUDISDD0003 S E C R E T SPECAT  
OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT  
IN & SYSTEMS.

FIGHTER SUPPORT OF OPERATION-  
SQUADRON AL PREPARATION, REPAIR  
MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE & READINESS  
SUPPORT TESTING OF COMBAT  
ELEMENT AIRCRAFT AND  
SYSTEMS. 20 ---- -2  
0

304 0 0 -4

9

OPERATIONS  
SUPPORT

LORAN C PROVIDES LONG-RANGE 13 ---- -11

--

RADIO NAVIGATION  
ASSISTANCE FOR  
SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

WEATHER PROVIDES SPECIAL 34 ---- -11

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WEATHER SERVICES FOR  
COMBAT OPERATIONS.

47 ---- -11 -11

SEARCH &  
RESCUE

SECRET

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HH-3 LONG RANGE, HIGH 34 ---- -2  
SPEED& HIGH CAPACITY  
HELICOPTER RESCUE IN  
PEACE OR COMBAT ENVIRON-  
MENT.

HC-130 IN PEACE OR COMBAT, 19 -20 ----  
LONG-RANGE SEARCH,  
IDENTIFICATION & RESCUE  
ASSISTANCE AND, THROUGH  
INFLIGHT REFUELING,

EXTENSION OF THE RANGE

PAGE SIX RUDISDD0003 S E C R E T SPECAT  
OF THE HELICOPTERS. BOTH  
OF THESE UNITS INCLUDE  
PERSONNEL SPECIALLY TRAINED  
AS MEDICAL PARACHUTISTS.

53 -20 0

-2

GENERAL HOUSEKEEPING,  
SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE &  
LOGISTIC SUPPORT  
FOR ALL DEFENSE  
FORCE ACTIVITIES.

NAVAL 709 ---- -283 -  
32  
STATION

AIR FORCES 127 ---- ---- -1  
1  
ICELAND  
SUPPORT

OTHER 3 ---- ---- -  
--  
SUPPORT

SECRET

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839 0 -283 -43

3317 -445 -409 -

200  
TOTAL REMAINING MILITARY 2872 2463 22

63  
UNQUOTE  
IRVING

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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